sudo 1.8.14(rhel 5/6/7/ubuntu)

Posted by punzalan at 2020-02-24
# Exploit Title: sudo -e - a.k.a. sudoedit - unauthorized privilege escalation # Date: 07-23-2015 # Exploit Author: Daniel Svartman # Version: Sudo <=1.8.14 # Tested on: RHEL 5/6/7 and Ubuntu (all versions) # CVE: CVE-2015-5602. Hello, I found a security bug in sudo (checked in the latest versions of sudo running on RHEL and ubuntu) when a user is granted with root access to modify a particular file that could be located in a subset of directories. It seems that sudoedit does not check the full path if a wildcard is used twice (e.g. /home/*/*/file.txt), allowing a malicious user to replace the file.txt real file with a symbolic link to a different location (e.g. /etc/shadow). I was able to perform such redirect and retrieve the data from the /etc/shadow file. In order for you to replicate this, you should configure the following line in your /etc/sudoers file: <user_to_grant_priv> ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: sudoedit /home/*/*/test.txt Then, logged as that user, create a subdirectory within its home folder (e.g. /home/<user_to_grant_priv>/newdir) and later create a symbolic link inside the new folder named test.txt pointing to /etc/shadow. When you run sudoedit /home/<user_to_grant_priv>/newdir/test.txt you will be allowed to access the /etc/shadow even if have not been granted with such access in the sudoers file. I checked this against fixed directories and files (not using a wildcard) and it does work with symbolic links created under the /home folder.